Leading European campaigner for freedom of religion points out that Japan’s state campaign against religious minorities is based on debunked and outdated concepts
Many scholars have abandoned the term “cult” as it lacks clear definition or boundaries: it is now primarily employed as a derogatory label to stigmatize “the other”. However, this word remains in common usage in Japan.
Prepared by Knut Holdhus
On 27th December 2024, Bitter Winter, the prominent international online magazine focused on religious freedom and human rights, published the second in a series of four articles by its director-in-charge, Marco Respinti. These articles were inspired by a lecture series he delivered in four Japanese cities – Hiroshima, Tokyo, Nagoya, and Fukuoka – from 6th to 10th December 2024. The events were organized by the Japan Committee of the International Coalition for Religious Freedom (ICRF).
The second of Bitter Winter’s articles was headlined “Made in Japan: No FoRB for the Family Federation. 2. Revamping the Debunked Notion of ‘Cult’”.
The Unification Church, a new religious movement, was founded in South Korea in 1954 by Rev. Sun Myung Moon (문선명, 1920–2012). Over the years, it gained significant popularity not only in South Korea but also in Japan and other countries.
However, as Respinti points out, public perception of new religious movements in Japan has been significantly influenced by the actions of another group – a very different one – Aum Shinrikyō. Following that group’s 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway and other criminal acts, many Japanese people began to view new religious movements generally, and sometimes religion as a whole, as more of a societal problem than a resource.
According to Marco Respinti, these crimes by Aum Shinrikyō fueled widespread hostility toward groups labeled – either maliciously or through ignorance – as “cults”, “fanatics”, or inherently linked to violence. However, in reality, most of these groups are peaceful. This hostility is particularly directed at new, lesser-known, or smaller religious organizations. Notably, the labels of “cult”, “fanaticism”, and “violence” are not always applied consistently. For instance, a “new religion” might be small and well-known, or large but relatively obscure, making such definitions inherently problematic.
The Bitter Winter editor explained that the term “cult” is often used to describe new or small religious movements, yet its application is highly contentious. Activists within the so-called anti-cult movement claim their efforts are focused solely on “cults”, but this is not entirely true.
Hostility toward religion often begins with a focus on “cults” but soon extends to religion in general. This occurs partly because the term “cult” is inherently ambiguous. It lacks scientific precision and is avoided by most scholars for this very reason. Instead of clarifying, the term muddies the waters. What distinguishes a “cult” from a “legitimate” religion? Who determines the dividing line, and what criteria are used? Is it appropriate for laws, secular governments, or codes to intervene in the intricate theologies, rituals, and histories of groups they scarcely comprehend?
Respinti writes that the use of the term “cult” is nearly always derogatory, serving to label individuals or groups that a person, organization, institution, or government wishes to discredit. It is a term imposed on “the other” without evidence. Ultimately, the meaning of “cult” is determined by the biases and intentions of those wielding the term.
According to Respinti, one of the most common accusations leveled at “cults” is that they engage in “brainwashing” to manipulate their members. However, this notion has been largely debunked as pseudo-scientific by the majority of Western scholars studying new religious movements, as well as by courts in the U.S. and other countries. Despite this, the rejection of “brainwashing” as a credible concept is not widely recognized in Japan.
Similarly, the scholarly pushback against the anti-cult narrative prevalent in media is also largely absent. In Japan, many scholars of religion hesitate to challenge the prevailing anti-cult rhetoric, fearing it could jeopardize their careers. This caution stems, in part, from the fallout experienced by some academics who had previously supported Aum Shinrikyō.
Respinti claims that it is worth noting that Japan’s anti-cult movement did not emerge in isolation. Historical factors, which cannot be fully explored here, play a role. For example, since the French Revolution, French governments have harbored a general suspicion of religion, particularly religious minorities deemed difficult to control. In France, governmental agencies are explicitly tasked with combating “cults” and promoting anti-cult ideology on an international scale.
“The Journal of CESNUR”, since 2017 an open access periodic about new religious movements, has documented collaborations between these French agencies and Japanese lawyers opposed to “cults,” which began in the late 20th century.
Marco Respinti emphasizes that investigative journalist Masumi Fukuda (福田ますみ) has provided extensive evidence on this topic, revealing that the motivations of these lawyers were not entirely altruistic. Many were driven by financial incentives, viewing lawsuits against “cults” as an opportunity for easy profit.
However, ideological factors also played a role. Most of these lawyers were socialists or communists, and their opposition was often directed at a specific religious movement: the Family Federation, previously known as the Unification Church. This organization was targeted for its success in Japan, particularly its anti-communist campaigns.
In summary, the term “cult” serves as a weaponized label, lacking clear definition or scholarly consensus. Its usage perpetuates prejudice and marginalization against new or minority religious groups, often obscuring their true nature as peaceful organizations. This dynamic is particularly pronounced in Japan, where historical and cultural factors have reinforced anti-cult rhetoric, leaving little room for the nuanced perspectives of religious scholars.
Featured image above: Marco Respinti delivering his speech in Nagoya, Japan 9th December 2025. Photo: ICRF Japan